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; TTTP SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
W E S T I N G H O U S K (151,1)1 I
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
{ Case JN O.
( 13533

vs.

H Y D R O S W I F T C() It IMI CATION, \
D-efendanl mid Appellant J

BRIEF OI " API1 Hi J -\, ll\!' II

STATEMENT

^

This is an ;u*ti*»n brought b\ the PLnntnT to enforce
ii guaranty purportedly executed by the Defendant
guaranteeing the floor planning account of a boat dealer
buying boat4- fv^*. Hip Plaintiff manufactured by the
Defendant.
DISPOSITION IN I.OWKH C O U R T
r

"I 'he case was tried to the Court. I'1 mn ,i jiHlgiuenl
for ii,e Plaintiff, Defendant appeals,
1
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R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
The Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment
and the entry of a judgment in favor of the Defendants
of no cause of action, or that failing, a new trial.

STATEMENT OF T H E FACTS
The Plaintiff is a corporation engaged in the business of financing the purchase by trust receipts and floor
planning of various commodities by retailers.
The Defendant is engaged in the manufacture and
sale of boats, the sales being to retail dealers and outlets.
I n 1972, a retail dealer by the name of L & S Boats,
located in Great Falls, Montana, wished to buy boats for
retail sale. As a means of purchasing the boats, L & S
Boats entered into a financing contract with the Plaintiff whereby Plaintiff would purchase the boats from
Defendant and cause their delivery to be made to L & S
Boats (Exhibits 5-P, 7-P, 8-P, 16-P). The boats were
to be held in trust by L & S Boats for the benefit of the
Plaintiff, and when each boat was sold, the original purchase price of the boat was to be transmitted to the
Plaintiff. This agreement between L & S Boats was
entered into in March of 1972 (R 53) (Exhibit 4-P).
Plaintiff required the Defendant to sign a guaranty of
L & S Boat's account as a condition for Plaintiff buying
and paying for the boats (Exhibit 1-P), although L & S
Boats did not know of the guaranty (R 84). I t was
2
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agreed by the parlies iiui; monthly floor checks of the
inventory won hi he conducted by Plaintiffs agent ( R
55) and floor cheeks h\ defendant every 00 days. T h e
guaranty is silent as to the amount of credit that was
purportedly guaranteed by th< Defendant; however,
Plaintiff admitted that tl.i- c redit amount was $25,000
(R56,TSi
Sir.,rih u.icr the agreements wen- signed, L \ S
Boats violated its trust agreement and -old boa Is without remitting I he cost piii-e to die Plaintiff. This situation persisted for several months and was known to
Plaintiff. On December -jo : ^ ~ 2 , the Defendant was
advised by the Plaintiff that L & S Boats was out of
trust on numerous IXKU.V and shortly thereafter, Defendant demanded that Plaintiff pick up the balance of
the boats then :still in the possession of L iV S Boats H
07). Plaintiff refused l do thiv , ]J and demanded that la Defendant pa\ to Plaintiff llu* remaining balance due from L & S Boats. D u r i n g this interval.
IJ & S Boats disposed of the remaining boats without
remitting to the Plaintiff any money realized from the
sale of the boats. Defendant refused to pay Plaintiff 1 Imbalance due to Plaintiff from L & S Boats and Plaintiff
thereupon brought suit against Defendan
n the guaranty for the claimed balance.
Defendant's sales invoices sold and delivered title
> ! the bonis io the Plaintiff and the Defendant did not
retain any 'hie or security interest in the boats ( R 76).
The evidence did not establish that Plaintiff ever perfected its security interest in »h*- hunt** \* M» proper filing
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of a UCC Form 1 with the Secretary of State of Montana (It 98, 99).
Plaintiff, at the time of trial, maintained that the
Defendant had an unequivocal duty to perform under
the guaranty. Defendant defended the action on the
grounds that the Plaintiff had breached its duty to the
Defendant by its failure to repossess the unsold boats
when it found that L & S Boats had been selling out of
trust; and further, that the guaranty was null and void
in that the same had not been approved by the Board of
Directors of the Defendant when the guaranty agreement expressly required such an approval (Exhibit 1P ) , and that Plaintiff had obtained other guarantors,
but had not named them in the action, and that Plaintiff
failed to perfect its security agreement with L & S
Boats to protect title. The matter was tried to the Court,
and upon judgment for the Plaintiff and against the
Defendant this appeal was taken.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S GUARANTY WAS VOIDED
B Y P L A I N T I F F ' S CONDUCT.
I t is the position of the Defendant that the Plaintiff had a duty to repossess the boats in the possession of
L & S Boats when the Plaintiff ascertained that L & S
Boats was selling boats out of trust and dissipating the
4
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proceeds of the inventory without paying Plaintiff, if
Plaintiff intended to look to Defendant on the guaranty.
The evidence was undisputed that the Plaintiff refused to repossess the boats or to take any steps whatsoever to protect the position of the guarantor, Defendant
Hydroswift Corporation, even though requested by it
to do so.
In the authoritative work 50 Am J u r 1011, Suretyship, Section 163, it is stated:
"The contract of suretyship imports entire good
faith and confidence between the parties in regard to the whole transaction. Moreover, a surety
is a favored debtor and his rights are zealously
guarded, both at law and in equity. Hence, the
slightest fraud on the part of the creditor, touching the contract, annuls it."
I n the instant case, the Plaintiff had title to the
boats. I t knew that the L & S Boat Company was selling
the boats out of trust and in violation of its agreement
with the Plaintiff, but Plaintiff took no steps to protect
itself or to protect the guarantor Defendant. Defendant
could not repossess the boats as title was in Plaintiff, and
L & S Boats held the boats under a trust agreement with
the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was in a position to satisfy its
debt, but chose not to do so.
Again, 50 Am J u r 970, Suretyship, Section 99, sets
forth the general law that:
"Failure to assert, setoff or counterdemand
against principal . . . ordinarily, a surety is discharged from the liability when a creditor, hav-
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ing in his possession or under his control the
means of satisfying the debt, chooses not to make
the appropriation and voluntarily parts therewith."
I t has long been the law that "In all suretyship relations, the creditor owes to the surety a duty of continuous good faith and fair dealing." Sumitomo Bank of
California vs. Iwasaki, (Calif. 1968) 73 Cal. Reporter
564, 447 P . 2d 956.
Since Utah has adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code (referred to as "UCC" herein) 70 A Section 3606, UCA, there can be little doubt that the release of
security by the holder serves as a release of the accommodation maker or guarantor (11 Am J u r 2d 981, Bills
<§ Notes, Sec. 939). The adoption of the UCC has overruled the Court's previous ruling in Felkner vs. Smith,
(1933), 77 U. 410, 296 P . 776. The effect of the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Law (sometimes referred
to as " N I L " ) repealed by the adoption of the UCC on
this question, has likewise become moot. In the Illinois
case of Key Credit Corporation vs. Young, (1970) 124
111. App. 2d 309, 260 N . E . 2d 488, the Appellate Court
discussed the Utah law with respect to the releasing of
chatteled property back to the maker of the note without
the consent or knowledge of an accommodation maker.
The case arose in the State of Utah and the case was decided on Utah law. The Illinois Court, after discussing
the law prior to the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable
Instrument Law, and subsequent thereto under the
UCC, and the effect of Wolstenholme vs. Smith, 34 U.
300, 97 P. 329, concluded by ruling:
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"We, too, are of the opinion that by releasing the
chattel mortgage property after default without
the consent or knowledge of Defendant, as accommodation maker, the Plaintiff discharged the
obligations of Defendant under the note. W e
realize that some cases have interpreted the N I L
differently. However, our holding is in conformity with both the common law existing prior to
the adoption of the N I L , and today's Uniform
Commercial Code which Utah adopted in 1966.
(See Utah Code Annotated 1953, Replacement,
Vol. 7B, Title 70A, Section 3-606)."
This case then goes on to hold that the discharge is
not necessarily complete, but it is effective only to the
extent that the accommodation maker has been injured.
This holding is in conformity with a similar ruling under
the UCC in the Oregon case of Christensen vs. McAtee,
(Oregon 1970) 473 P. 2d 659. Wyoming has followed
this rationale in the case of Shaffer vs. Davidson, (Wyo.
1968) 445 P . 2d 13. See annotation 2 A L R 2d 260, 269.
In the authoritative work on the UCC, 3 Anderson
Uniform Commercial Code, 2 Ed. 129, Section 3-606:7,
it states:
"The holder of a negotiable instrument discharges any party to the instrument to the extent
that, without such party's consent, the holder unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by or on behalf of that party or any
person against whom he has a right of recourse."
In the instant case, we have even a stronger case
than those cases where the guarantor or accommodation
maker was looking to chatteled or pledged security. I n
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the instant case, title to the merchandise was vested in
the Plaintiff although possession was in L & S Boats
under the trust agreement and floor plan. There was no
way that Defendant could assume the position of the
primary debtor as pointed out in the Felkner vs. Smith
case. That the Defendant was damaged is obvious, and
that the amount of that damage is susceptible to computation by reviewing Exhibit 3-P which shows the inventory then on hand with L & S Boats when demand
was made by Hydroswift to repossess the boats. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2-P, the letter of December 27, 1972,
showed that the inventory on hand was valued at
$13,721.07 at wholesale prices. The evidence further
showed that in January of 1973, when Defendant again
requested the Plaintiff to pick up the remaining boats,
there was approximately $9,000 in merchandise left at
L & S Boats ( R 4 8 ) .
Plaintiff attempted to show that in addition to title
to the boats, that it had perfected a security lien under
the UCC of Montana. However, Plaintiff failed to introduce into evidence recorded copies of the UCC Form
1 and the Defendant moved that all references to the
UCC Form 1 be stricken (R 98, 99). The Court erred
in not striking the testimony with respect to it (Rule 4,
Rules of Evidence, Utah).
3 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, 2d Ed.
129, Sec. 3-606:8 states:
"The failure to perfect a security interest under
Article 9 is an 'impairing' of collateral within
the discharge provision of Article 3 . . .
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"Consequently, where a creditor is given chattel
mortgage on an automobile to secure payment of
a note, the chattel mortgage constitutes 'collateral' and if the creditor fails to file the mortgage
with the result that it has no effect as against a
subsequent purchaser of the automobile, there is
a failure to preserve collateral within the meaning of Code Sec. 9-207, and an accommodation
maker on the note is discharged under Code Sec.
3-606." (See Shaffer vs. Davidson, op cite)
POINT II
P L A I N T I F F F A I L E D TO PROVE T H A T T H E
GUARANTY W A S AN O F F I C I A L ACT OF
DEFENDANT AND THEREFORE,
THE
COURT E R R E D IN GRANTING J U D G M E N T
B A S E D ON G U A R A N T Y .
Plaintiff's entire case is based upon the guaranty
which was purportedly executed by the corporation.
Plaintiff introduced into evidence Exhibit 1-P which
shows that a Mr. Ludlow executed the guaranty, but
nothing is shown as to his corporate office or capacity.
The guaranty form used by the Plaintiff has printed on it in bold type:
"The signature of each corporate guarantor must
be supported by a certified copy of a board resolution or by-law naming the officer or officers
authorized to sign."
It is evident that the Plaintiff recognized the general law which requires that corporate authority be
shown for the execution of a guaranty.
9
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The general law is stated by 19 Am J u r 2d 607,
Corporations, Section 1183:
"A corporation is not liable upon a contract of
suretyship or guaranty made by an officer, in
the absence of evidence that the contract was
within the authority of the officer as expressly or
impliedly conferred upon him by statute, by-law
or the act or acquiesence of its managing body, or
was properly incidental to business entrusted to
him by that body, or was within his ostensible authority as established by the practice of the company, or was ratified by the proper authority."
In an annotation in 34 A L R 2d 290, Authority of
Officer or Agent to Bind Corporation as Guarantor, at
page 291, it is stated, after reasserting the principle laid
down by the 19 Am J u r 2d statement:
"Although this general rule applies to all contracts of a corporation, it has specific application
to those of suretyship or guaranty because these
are not usually contemplated as within the regular course of commercial business."
No corporate authorization was asked for at the
time of the signing of the guaranty and no corporate authorization was ever delivered.
The Plaintiff had the burden of showing the corporate authority of the officer executing the guaranty
(9 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations 506). The officer
being an agent, the law of agency applies. As stated in
Fuller vs. Stout, (Okla. 1917) 166 P . 898 at page 900:
"That agency is a fact, the burden of proving
which rests upon the party affirming its existence, is an unquestioned canon of the law."
10
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As stated in 19 Am J u r 649, Corporations, Section
1239:
"It is for him who asserts that such authority
exists to prove it."
Plaintiff, in its Complaint, did not specifically
allege corporate authority; however, Defendant denied
the entire guaranty. This put the matter of the guaranty
in issue. Plaintiff did not attempt to introduce any evidence or testimony with respect to the existence of corporate authority of Mr. Ludlow, or to show any other
facts which would allow the finding of apparent or ostensible authority on the part of Mr. Ludlow to execute
the guaranty on behalf of the corporation (Grover vs.
Gam, 23 U. 2d 441, 464 P.2d 598; Amoss vs. Bennion,
18 U. 2d 251, 420 P. 2d 47). The facts of each case must
be looked at to determine whether or not there is such
authority (Peterson vs. Holmgren Land and Livestock
Company, 12 U. 2d 125, 363 P. 2d 786).
The form used by the Plaintiff showed on its face
that the corporate authority was required to be evidenced
at the time that the document was to be executed. Plaintiff cannot now be heard to assert estoppel, apparent or
ostensible authority. It well knew that such a guaranty
was outside the scope of general corporate authority and
that it could not rely upon the signature of an officer
alone.
The failure of the Plaintiff to prove corporate authority is fatal; and therefore, the Court erred in finding
that there was a viable and legally binding guaranty
which bound the Defendant corporation.
11
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court
erred in not granting Defendant's motion to dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint.
The Court further erred in ruling that the guaranty
executed by the Defendant was a corporate act and that
the corporation was bound thereby.
The Court further erred in not holding that the Defendant's guaranty was voided by Plaintiff's conduct in
refusing to repossess the boats and to sell the same
to satisfy the indebtedness.
Respectfully submitted,
P A U L N. C O T R O - M A N E S of
Cotro-Manes, Warr,
Fankhauser & Beasley
Attorney for Appellant
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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